The article is concerned with D. Davidson\'s semantic views. The aim of the article is to explain some misunderstandings that have arisen in the course of reception of these views. The author tries to prove that according to Davidson semantic properties and relations do not come under classical definitions, but under contextual ones, like in L. Wittgenstein\'s semantics. Hence the interpretation presented by J. Kmita is incorrect, whereas that by R. Rorty is right. Causal explanation of semantics is out of (...) the question; hence Rorty\'s interpretation is false with respect to this point. Propositions talk about what they talk about, so Kmita is wrong. According to Davidson the concept of reference is permissible, so Putnam is wrong in his interpretation. Moreover, there is only one logic semantics and for all languages it is the same, hence Kmita is wrong when he says that Davidson\'s interpreter arbitrarily pushes foreign semantics into his own. He is also wrong when he puts in Davidson\'s mouth the conviction that non-determination of a translation does not consist in impossibility to cognize foreign semantics. (shrink)

OBJECTIVE PREDICATION The author claims that there are two kinds of predicates that are used to describe cognitive states of mind like beliefs or perception. Using some of them, one can describe the cognitive states of mind directly, whereas using some others, one can describe these states in comparison with one’s own. For example, one can say that a person has a belief or one can say that that person’s belief is according to his own beliefs. In the latter situation, (...) he uses the predicate “to know”. The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John knows that p” are as follows: (1) Peter believes that John believes that p; (2) Peter believes that p; (3) Peter believes that the reasons for which John believes that p have a good justification. In a similar way one can ascribe to somebody a visual impression of an object x or to compare that person’s impressions with his own cognitive states. In the latter situation one uses the predicate “to see” (to perceive). The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John can see x” are the following: (I) Peter believes that John has visual impression of object x; (II) Peter believes that object x exists; (III) Peter believes that this that John has visual impression of object x is according to the laws of vision. When one uses predicates that describe cognitive states of mind of a person (possession of beliefs or sensory impressions), one speaks subjectively, whereas when one speaks objectively, he uses predicates that allow him to compare cognitive states of mind of a person with his own. Keywords: PREDICATION, BELIEFS, PERCEPTION. (shrink)

Author: Godlewski Roman P. Title: SOURCES OF DUALISM OF CONTENT AND CONCEPTUAL SCHEME I.E. ON SOME FAULTS OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (Źródła dualizmu schematu pojęciowego i treści, czyli o kilku błędach filozofii zachodniej. Uwagi z zakresu filozofii analitycznej) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 243-258 Keywords: DUALISM OF CONTENT AND CONCEPTUAL SCHEME, RORTY, KMITA, WHORF Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The aim in the article is to explain why we (...) fall in dualism of content and conceptual scheme. The dualism says that there is a relation between languages and the world (meant as an object). The first cause is mechanistic way of thinking which characterizes Indoeuropean mind. The way on thinking is to treat every object as if it had formal properties of physical objects. The term is taken from Whorf’s works. Concequences of mechanistic thinking for research in abstract sciences is considered. It is demonstrated how mechanistic thinking lets to pass from belief that there are some relations between expressions of a language and elements of the world to belief that there is a relation between the language as a whole and the whole world. The fallowing causes of the dualism are also considered: 1. literal understanding of metaphores used in philosophy of language, 2. wrong understanding of suppositions, 4. attempts to explain language in natural terms, e.g. causal theory of meaning. (shrink)

Let us ask: do the objects we think that exist, really exist? Davidson concludes, from rejection of dualism of content and conceptual scheme, that most of them really exist (coherentialism). Unfortunately, his reasoning is wrong, because though the rejection makes it impossible to doubt our knowledge as a whole, it is still possible to doubt all its elements one after another. The two main points of Davidson's theory are the following: (1) disquotationism (semantic terms are used only to speak about (...) speaking) and (2) ostensivism (words refer to what they refer to independently of what it could be; their meanings are established as the result of the process of learning). (1) and (2) are the real reasons for Davidson's coherentialism. Ostensivism apparently allows to avoid the problem of induction, though it only transforms the problem into the question of ostension. Moreover, consistent ostensivism makes analytic sentences impossible. Yet it is claimed, that ostensivism is wrong in general, because besides ostensives there are also categorials (expressions, meanings of which belong to certain ontological categories) and without the latter logic and mathematics would be impossible. Davison's coherentialism is wrong because it is not true that one cannot have any believes without having any language. Hence, no theory of language is crucial as far as existence is concerned. It is shown considering ascription of believes to mute persons and learning languages by children. Coherentialism lets Davidson bring down the idea of a demon that could make us see the world completely different than it is and not know if it is true. (shrink)

The objection raised by Davidson against Kuhn in article "On the Very Idea of Conceptual Scheme" that the argument presented in "The Structure of Scientific Revolution" was inconsistent is incorrect. Kuhn's conception belongs to psychology and sociology and his work could be titled "An Outline of Psychology and Sociology of Scientific Research". Consequently he is interested only and only in psychologi-cal reasons that affect scientists' theoretical decisions. E.g. his considerations concerning neutral observational language are polemous against thesis that language like (...) that could be somehow useful for interpretation of what scientists do and also against thesis that it could be useful for scientists themselves. The difficulty of un-derstanding above paradigmata does not consist on conceptual schemata meant logically as Davidson reads it but on different cognitive attitude and different manual sets of concepts. To explain the controversy logical and psychological concepts of meaning are distinguished. Davidson means the proper, Kuhn does the latter. Psy-chological meaning concists on what associations and feelings are evocated by utterances in the recever's mind. When Kuhn says that after a revolution scientists live in another world he means only that the language with witch they describe the reality has different psychological meaning. And this is that kind of meaning that cannot be translated and is lost when you discuss above paradigmata. From Kuhn's point of view it is possible to translate logical meaning of scientific utterances from before a revolution, and he does it. The psychological meaning can be only described but not translated. (shrink)